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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND 






The technological and electoral landscapes have changed 
drastically since the turn of the century. While it once might have 
made sense to view voting online as unconstitutional, as opposed to 
merely impractical, the expanded range of Internet access for 
minority communities has made that argument tenuous at best. 
While there still may exist practical and political reasons to avoid 
Internet voting, the Constitution no longer stands as an effective 
wall against the practice. Furthermore, the primary statutory 
obstacle to the implementation of Internet voting on a local level, 
the Voting Rights Act, has been greatly weakened by the recent 
Supreme Court decision in Shelby County. As such, now is the 
perfect time for state-level experimentation in the field of Internet 
voting. 
INTRODUCTION 
Voting in the United States overwhelmingly takes place at physical 
polling locations where voters assemble, in person, to choose their leaders 
and representatives. Some states, however, have moved away from the 
prototypical election structure by introducing alternative means for voters to 
cast their ballots. All states do this to a minor extent through mail-in 
absentee voting,
1
 but some have gone even further to allow so-called “one-
stop” absentee voting.2 The process of one-stop voting is remarkably similar 
to traditional Election-Day voting, but the legal structure surrounding the 
casting of the ballots is entirely different. In North Carolina, for example, 
one-stop voting is viewed more similarly to mail-in absentee voting than it 
is to Election-Day voting—this is why the number and operational hours of 
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polling places do not need to be uniform throughout the state.
3
 Other states, 
such as Washington, have completely eliminated Election-Day voting, 
replacing it with mail-in ballots for every qualified voter.
4
 Rather than 
assembling at a single location on Election Day, or even over a series of 
days as with North Carolina’s one-stop system, Washington voters are able 
to make their decisions at their leisure and without the pressure of time-
constraints or the worry of being bullied or harassed by others.
5
 A voter in 
Washington has approximately eighteen days in which to vote, and every 
voter has an equal opportunity to do so.
6
 
Internet voting takes the idea of one-stop absentee voting and 
universal mail-in voting a step further. Rather than relying on the archaic 
systems of physical presence and physically-transported paper documents, 
both of which are time-consuming and costly, Internet voting relies on the 
most efficient communications network ever designed. Voters in a state that 
had instituted Internet voting would be able to have the same sort of 
unhurried and thoughtful decision-making opportunity as Washington 
voters currently enjoy; and election officials would be able to avoid much of 
the hassle of printing, distributing, collecting, and tabulating paper ballots.
7
 
But Internet voting arguably faces three major hurdles before it 
could be implemented. First, one must consider whether or not Internet 
voting is constitutional. The Constitution of course does not discuss Internet 
voting in as many words, but the Twenty-Fourth Amendment’s prohibition 
of poll taxes may stand in the way of a state trying to implement Internet 
voting. Second, the Voting Rights Act
8
 might prohibit a state or locality 
from implementing Internet voting. While Section Four of the Voting 
                                                     
3
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8
 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101–10702 (West Supp. 2014) (originally codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2012)). 
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Rights Act was recently struck down as unconstitutional in Shelby County v. 
Holder,
9
 Section Two, which allows for suits brought after a denial of equal 
access to voting, remains. Furthermore, Section Five, requiring preclearance 
of election law changes for certain areas of the country, also could prevent 
the implementation of Internet voting, but that would require a new 
coverage formula to be developed to replace Section Four. 
Finally, there are practical and political concerns with Internet 
voting. Chief among these is the very real possibility that the system could 
be hacked, crashed, or otherwise rendered inoperable or untrustworthy, as 
well as doubts over the political feasibility of passing legislation 
implementing Internet voting. Concerns over trustworthiness have been 
leveled against electronic voting machines at in-person voting locations,
10
 
and at least in some instances technical errors have actually led to 
inaccurate results.
11
 Additionally, the recent failed rollout of healthcare.gov 
raises serious concerns about whether or not the government can effectively 
manage a large online system like would be required here.
 12
 
This Issue Brief will focus on the first and second of these issues. 
While practical and political concerns are important for any serious 
proponent of Internet voting to confront, the purpose of this Brief is simply 
to argue that there is no legal barrier to Internet voting. Whether or not 
Internet voting is a good idea, or one which would even be feasible, is 
outside the scope of this Brief. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROHIBIT INTERNET VOTING  
The most fundamental obstacle to Internet voting, as with any 
change in law, is the United States Constitution.
13
 But despite what others 
have argued,
14
 Internet voting would not violate the Twenty-Fourth 
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 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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 Brett Stohs, Is I-Voting I-Llegal?, 2003 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0013 ¶ 13 & n.25. 
This article was published while Professor Stohs was a student at Duke University 
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Amendment or any other constitutional provision. Professor Brett Stohs 
believes it would, although his argument is not fully developed.
15
 The 
purpose of this section is to explain and counter that claim. While an 
incredibly strict understanding and implementation of Internet voting would 
admittedly push up against the constitutional line, a well-designed system 
could avoid the constitutional challenge.
16
 
A. How a Strict Implementation of Internet Voting Would Run Afoul 
of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment  
The Twenty-Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or 
other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President 
or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason 
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
17
 
This absolute right to vote without paying a tax also applies to the 
election of state officials.
18
 In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 
the Supreme Court held that “a State violates the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or 
payment of any fee an electoral standard.”19 
From the text of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment and the holding of 
Harper, it is clear that any payment or wealth status required to be eligible 
to vote is unconstitutional. Thus, if Internet voting were to fall under this 
category, it would be unconstitutional. 
                                                                                                                       
conclusions may also have been correct at the time of his writing, but modern 
trends have called his arguments into doubt. While both of these considerations are 
important to bear in mind, the argument presented in Is I-Voting I-Llegal? serves as 
a useful launching point for the argument presented here, especially considering the 
relative dearth of scholarship on this topic. 
15
 See id. ¶ 13 (stating simply: “[a]t present, such a scheme would certainly violate 
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.”). 
16
 There may of course be other elements of an Internet voting system that would 
render it unconstitutional, but those have little to do with the Internet element 
explored here. For example, one could conceive of an Internet voting system that 
would violate one-person-one-vote or some other constitutional voting requirement. 
Such a system would be unconstitutional, but not because it is online. The claim 
made throughout, that Internet voting is constitutional, should therefore be viewed 
as a more concise phrasing of the idea that voting over the Internet does not present 
any constitutional challenges unique to that method.  
17
 U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
18
 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). 
19
 Id. at 666. 
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Internet voting would almost certainly count as a wealth status 
requirement for voting if individual Internet access was absolutely required 
in order to vote. Paying for an Internet connection of any form—high-
speed, dial-up, even mobile—requires some non-zero amount of disposable 
income.
20
 While this payment would not necessarily be made to the 
government (and therefore might not properly be characterized as a tax), it 
would seem to fit under Harper’s prohibition of making the “affluence of 
the voter . . . an electoral standard.”21 
However, any way around paying for a personal Internet connection 
would weaken the argument that Internet voting requires a certain level of 
affluence. Therefore, in order to be clearly unconstitutional, a scheme of 
Internet voting would have to require individually purchased or controlled 
Internet access that has a non-zero cost. The availability of free Internet 
access would negate the constitutional challenge. 
Internet voting would therefore be prohibited by the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment only if it were to be implemented in an extremely strict 
manner: the only way one can vote is by Internet, and the only Internet 
connection one can use is one that the individual pays for in some way. 
Such a system would be more extreme than the similar Washington state 
system, because that allows for returns of ballots by hand rather than by any 
means requiring payment. 
B. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment Does Not Prohibit Internet Voting  
While the preceding section described how Internet voting could 
possibly violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, it is unlikely that any 
scheme developed would actually do so. Remember that two criteria must 
exist for Internet voting to be unconstitutional:  
1. Internet voting must be the only method of voting 
available. 
2. The only Internet connection one can use to vote is one 
that the individual pays for, either through purchase or 
rent. 
Because the primary purpose of this section is to argue against the 
claim put forward by Professor Stohs in his article, which itself was limited 
to situations where Internet voting was the only available method of 
voting,
22
 this Brief will assume the truth of the first criterion. If Internet 
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voting were simply implemented as an additional method of voting, 
alongside traditional Election-Day physical voting, there would be no issue. 
But, while this Brief will accept the first criterion, and in fact the author 
would actually prefer this criterion to be met for the sake of simplicity in the 
system, it is worth noting what this criterion does not require. 
Internet voting could be the only method of voting available in two 
possible ways. The first would be if there were no way to walk, drive, or 
ride to any other location, such as to the Board of Elections or similar 
governmental organization, to cast a vote in person. This is the obvious 
inference one could draw from the concept of Internet voting. But 
remember that Internet voting is useful for two broad reasons: 
1. Internet voting is more convenient for the voter. 
2. Internet voting is more convenient for election 
officials. 
A system designed so that some individuals could vote from home 
on their computers and others could vote from a centralized polling location 
might therefore seem to simply be the either-or, additional-method, system 
dismissed earlier. But if the centralized locations are tied into the same 
system as the cast-from-home online votes are (for example, if the 
centralized location used the same website as was available from home, 
rather than a different website that then required data to be moved over), 
then the benefits to the election officials still manifest, even if there is no 
added convenience for any particular voter. 
These benefits to election officials should be viewed relative to the 
present system. Setting up a centralized location for voting would lower the 
total cost of administering an election.
23
 This is because fewer centralized 
locations would be required than are needed for mandatory in-person 
voting. When that benefit is viewed alongside the savings in tabulation 
costs because of the automated nature of the online system, the end result is 
a large increase in both convenience and efficiency for the election officials. 
A key aspect of this system would be that the voter at the 
centralized location would be using the same interface as someone voting 
from home. Their votes would not be differentiated in any way, except for 
perhaps by IP address (but only if the IP address were tracked for every 
voter, which would raise its own issues related to voter privacy). 
                                                     
23
 See Benefits of the Vote Center Model, LARIMER COUNTY, 
http://www.co.larimer.co.us/elections/votecenter/votecenters_benefits.htm (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2014) (noting that there are “cost savings in many areas including 
requiring fewer election workers and fewer election supplies” from establishing 
Vote Centers, larger and more centralizing voting locations distinct from traditional 
precincts). 
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What this centralized location would amount to, then, would be a 
glorified Internet café with only one website available. But the key 
criterion—that Internet voting be the only voting available—would still be 
met. 
This second way of looking at the first criterion, that a centralized 
location does not negate it because the practical benefits for the election 
officials still exist, leads directly into solving the problem implicated by the 
second criterion. Because this Brief accepts the premise that Internet voting 
is the only form of voting in this hypothetical scenario, if voting cannot be 
performed for free, then the entire scheme is unconstitutional.
24
 Even 
Washington has apparently recognized this fact in allowing their mailed 
ballots to be hand-returned, rather than requiring the purchase of a stamp.
25
 
But, as described above, establishing a central location from which 
people can vote using the online system does not make Internet voting any 
less universal. So long as this centralized location is free to use, the second 
criterion is not met and Internet voting is constitutional (at least as far as the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment is concerned). 
Even if, however, a particular state decided not to have a free, state-
run election location from which voters without personal Internet 
connections could vote, an Internet voting scheme might still be able to 
survive a constitutional attack. Public libraries offer Internet access on their 
computers for free.
26
 Many locations, such as coffee shops, offer free 
Internet access so long as an individual uses their own device.
27
 And others, 
such as big-box stores, might be able to convert their existing public 
computers (demonstration floor models, employment application terminals, 
and the like) to allow access to a voting website, especially if there is some 
governmentally-provided incentive for doing so. 
Some of these options, such as libraries or incentivized big-box 
stores, are absolutely free for the voter. Others, such as coffee shops, require 
some level of personal wealth, but in a more abstract context with which we 
are already familiar, like requiring a small purchase to remain in the space. 
While owning an Internet-capable device might require being affluent, it is 
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 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE: ELECTIONS & VOTING, supra note 4. 
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 See, e.g., Acceptable Use of the Internet and Library Public Computers, 
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important to keep in mind, too, that despite the exact wording of Harper, 
some level of wealth is required to vote under the current system—
transportation to the voting location will not necessarily be free.
28
 
Thus, there are a number of free options available for voters in an 
Internet voting regime. These options range from completely government 
funded and operated centralized locations such as public libraries to 
government- or market-incentivized private businesses. Additionally, 
Internet access is available for free provided the voter already owns or can 
obtain an Internet-accessible device (similar to the current requirement that 
the voter owns or can obtain a means of transportation to the physical polls) 
at a number of locations that may be easier to access than a public library. 
Because these options would be available under an Internet voting 
scheme, the second criterion of unconstitutionality is not met. Internet 
voting could be implemented without running up against the prohibition on 
poll taxes in the Twenty-Fourth Amendment. 
II. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT DOES NOT PROHIBIT INTERNET 
VOTING 
Clearing the constitutional hurdle of the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment is not enough, on its own, to make Internet voting legal. 
Internet voting must, in addition to being available at no charge to voters, 
avoid running afoul of the statutory prohibitions on election laws 
established in the Voting Rights Act.
29
 The Voting Rights Act deals with 
racial discrimination in voting, and has two main operative sections that will 
be discussed in this Brief. The first is Section Two, which makes it illegal 
for a state to dilute the vote of a racial group or to deny equal access to 
voting to a specific racial group.
30
 The second is Section Five, which 
requires certain jurisdictions to clear any changes in election law with the 
Department of Justice before those changes take effect.
31
 However, as this 
Brief will explain in more detail below, neither of these sections would 
serve as much of a barrier against Internet voting today, even though they 
would have just a short time ago. 
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 See USA National Gas Price Heat Map, GASBUDDY.COM, http://www.gasbuddy. 
com/gb_gastemperaturemap.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (displaying current gas 
prices throughout the country, with many locations having an average price of over 
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 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101–10702 (West Supp. 2014) (originally codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2012)). 
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 Id. § 10301; see also Voting Rights Act, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law. 
cornell.edu/wex/voting_rights_act (last visited Apr. 13, 2014) (explaining the vote-
dilution aspect of Section Two).  
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 52 U.S.C.A. § 10304 (West Supp. 2014); see also LEGAL INFO. INST., supra note 
30 (explaining how Section Five operates). 
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A. Section Two Does Not Prohibit Internet Voting 
Whether or not Section Two of the Voting Rights Act prohibits 
Internet voting depends on whether or not the vote of a specific racial group 
is diluted and whether or not a specific racial group is denied equal access 
to voting. Neither of these, however, is true of Internet voting. 
1. Internet voting does not dilute the voting power of any racial group 
In order for a challenge under Section Two of the Voting Rights 
Act to succeed on vote dilution grounds, the plaintiffs must show that three 
elements have been met: 
1. “[T]he minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a 
majority in a single-member district”32 
2. “[T]he minority group must be able to show that it is politically 
cohesive.”33 That is, members of the minority racial group must 
vote similarly to one another, so that they can be said to have a 
preferred group candidate. Additionally, members of the white 
majority must vote similarly to one another, so that their 
candidate usually defeats the minority’s candidate.34 
3. The challenged procedure must have racially discriminatory 
effects when viewed under the totality of the circumstances.
35
 
It is highly unlikely that these three elements would be able to be 
proven about an Internet voting procedure. Internet voting does not affect 
the organization of districts, which makes the first two elements incredibly 
difficult to prove. Even if they could be proven, however, showing that 
Internet voting has racially discriminatory effects would be difficult.  
2. Internet voting does not deny any racial group equal access to voting 
Similarly, Internet voting does not deny any racial group equal 
access to voting. At its core, this test under Section Two makes Internet 
voting illegal if a racial group’s “members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.”36 This test is one of results, not of intent; a 
discriminatory effect is enough to render Internet voting illegal even if it 
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 Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
33




 Id. at 46; see also Stohs, supra note 14, ¶ 18. 
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 52 U.S.C.A. § 10301 (West Supp. 2014). 
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was not implemented with the intent to discriminate.
37
 However, as detailed 
below, the data does not support the claim that Internet voting would deny 
any racial group equal access to voting. 
The question here is whether or not Internet voting would have a 
discriminatory effect on any protected class of citizens. The answer to that 
question is no, for two reasons. First, because of the ability for individuals 
to still vote, as usual, at outside-the-home physical locations; and second, 
because the racial digital divide is shrinking incredibly fast and should no 
longer generate the same amount of concern it once did. 
The first of these reasons has already been addressed.
38
 Outside-of-
the-home physical locations could be made available for individuals, and 
doing so would be at least as effective as the current system requiring in-
person voting. If an individual cannot make it to the latter location, they 
would be similarly unable to make it to the former, and vice-versa. 
But looking beyond the basic nature of these locations, the money 
saved by a switch to Internet voting (by removing the need to have as many 
in-person locations open
39
) can be redirected to having more voter outreach 
and voting locations for racial groups who may be disproportionately 
affected by the switch. In fact, if that transition were to occur, it would 
likely actually increase the percentage of racial minorities who vote, rather 
than decrease it. Racial groups with Internet access would see an increase 
due to convenience, but so would racial minorities without Internet access.  
The second reason itself can be looked at from two perspectives: 
current statistics and trend lines toward the future. Simply looking at current 
statistics, there may exist some level of concern about discriminatory racial 
effects from a transition to Internet voting. But when one looks at where the 
lines are pointing and what is likely to occur by the time any government 
makes a full transition, the discriminatory effects are likely to be highly 
mitigated, if not eliminated. 
For example, in 2012, a larger percentage of Hispanic and black 
individuals owned smartphones than did white individuals.
40
 And looking at 
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 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35 (noting that Congress revised Section Two “to make 
clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone”). 
38
 See supra Part I.B. 
39
 See LARIMER COUNTY, supra note 23 (noting that there are “cost savings in many 
areas including requiring fewer election workers and fewer election supplies” from 
establishing Vote Centers, larger and more centralizing voting locations distinct 
from traditional precincts). 
40
 Mark Hugo Lopez, et al., Closing the Digital Divide: Latinos and Technology 
Adoption, PEWRESEARCHCENTER HISPANIC TRENDS PROJECT (Mar. 7, 2013), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/03/07/closing-the-digital-divide-latinos-and-
technology-adoption/. 
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who goes online from a mobile device, Hispanic and black individuals far 
surpass white individuals: seventy-six percent for Hispanic individuals, 
seventy-three percent for black individuals, and sixty percent for white 
individuals.
41
 Overall, white individuals use the Internet more often than 
black or Hispanic individuals, but the latter groups still use the Internet far 
more often than not: seventy-eight percent of both groups answer 
affirmatively to questions about basic Internet usage.
42
 
Looking beyond the simple statistics, the trend seems to be moving 
toward members of racial minorities having greater access to smartphones 
and home Internet than white individuals. “Although disparities in Internet 
use for households persisted across race and Hispanic origin groups in 2011, 
they appear to be shrinking.”43 While the difference in how racial groups 
access the Internet may persist, long-term demographic shifts will likely 
lead to increased smartphone use across racial lines.
44
 
This data does not necessarily point towards there being no Section 
Two problem with Internet voting if it were somehow implemented swiftly 
and immediately. But the world is certainly better off than it was in 2003, 
when only 61.8 percent of the overall population had a computer in the 
home,
45
 and the racial divide appears to be closing. If Internet voting were 
phased in over a five-year period, these numbers would likely have 
converged much more closely and made the racially discriminatory effects 
claim far less likely to succeed. 
Age also plays a role in election discrimination, although it is not 
explicitly contemplated by the Voting Rights Act. America is moving in the 
direction of becoming a majority-minority country, with minority birth rates 
outnumbering white birth rates.
46
 One implication of this is that younger 




 Id. White individuals answer with an eighty-seven percent affirmative to the 
same questions. Id. 
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Smartphones on Digital Divide, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 10, 2013), 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2013/cb13-111.html. 
44
 See Will Oremus, New Digital Divide: Whites Less Likely to Own Smartphones, 
SLATE (Aug. 7, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/08/07/ 
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45
 THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 1 (2013), available at http://www.census. 
gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-569.pdf. 
46
 Jeffrey S. Passel, et al., Explaining Why Minority Births Now Outnumber White 
Births, PEWRESEARCHCENTER SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (May 17, 2012), 
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voters are more likely to be racial minorities than older voters. Current 
voting trends arguably make it more difficult for these younger voters, 
especially those who are members of racial minorities, to vote.
47
 
Internet voting could be the solution to this problem. Current voting 
laws have a disparate impact on racial minorities because they prevent 
young, and therefore disproportionately minority, individuals from voting. 
However, these young individuals make up the same group that would 
likely benefit most from Internet voting. Young individuals use the Internet 
more often than older individuals.
48
 Therefore, by implementing Internet 
voting, a jurisdiction would be making it easier for young members of racial 
minorities to vote, countering current legislative trends against youth 
voting. 
Therefore, because Internet voting would not dilute the voting 
power of any racial group; because it may actually work to counter current 
racially discriminatory policies based on age; and because it would not, at 
least if implemented gradually, have a racially discriminatory effect, it does 
not violate Section Two of the Voting Rights Act. 
B. Section Five Does Not Prohibit Internet Voting 
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act is a complicated area of law 
at this time. The Supreme Court has effectively rendered Section Five 
inoperable as a result of its decision in Shelby County,
49
 which held that the 
coverage formula contained in Section Four was unconstitutional.
50
 
However, there is still the possibility that Section Five will have fresh teeth 
if Congress enacts a new coverage formula, and therefore it is worth 
discussing. 
The first notable point with regards to Section Five is that it is 
unlikely to have any real effect if Section Two is not implicated. Section 
Five is meant to preclear certain jurisdictions—to prevent them from 
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implementing a law before its constitutionality is checked.
51
 Therefore, the 
entire preceding argument related to Section Two applies equally well here, 
because if Internet voting does not violate Section Two then it is unlikely to 
be denied under a Section Five preclearance evaluation. The most that 
would be expected is the requirement for some further hard data, meaning a 
jurisdiction not subject to preclearance would have to implement Internet 
voting first in order to generate numbers which would then be used to 
evaluate the potential racially discriminatory effect in a jurisdiction subject 
to preclearance. 
Even beyond this, however, the key thing to examine is not merely 
how Internet voting would treat racial minorities, but how Internet voting 
would treat racial minorities compared to the current system. This requires 
looking at how members of racial minorities currently vote (by travelling to 
the polling location) and comparing that to how they could potentially vote 
in an Internet voting system (from home, or from a nearby location). 
Public transportation is primarily used by people of color.
52
 In the 
nine states covered as a whole by the old formula of Section Four,
53
 only 
one city—Arlington, Virginia—scored over a 50 on a 100-point Transit 
Score scale by Walk Score.
54
 These numbers indicate that physical access to 
a polling place is already difficult for racial minorities in the areas that were 
covered by the Voting Rights Act. A change to Internet voting might have a 
similar impact on individuals within those groups, but it would not likely be 
enough to lead to denial of the change, especially if another state had 
already tried the new system. 
Therefore, because Section Five only prohibits voting schemes 
which Section Two would also prohibit, and because a comparative view of 
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current mass-transit availability with Internet access ability shows that a 
switch would not have any more of a discriminatory effect on racial 
minorities than the current system does, Section Five of the Voting Rights 
Act is unlikely to prevent the adoption of an Internet voting scheme. 
CONCLUSION 
 Internet voting is the future of electoral politics in this country. 
While there may be political and policy reasons why Internet voting will be 
delayed in coming to fruition, it faces no legal obstacles, either 
constitutional or statutory. The constitutional prohibition on poll taxes does 
not apply to Internet voting because of the wide range of alternative and 
free opportunities to vote that could, and likely would, be implemented. The 
statutory Voting Rights Act does not prohibit Internet voting through either 
Section Two or Section Five, because Internet voting would not have 
racially discriminatory effects. Furthermore, it is not prohibited by Section 
Five because it would be no worse than the current racially discriminatory 
system, which requires the use of public transportation. And because 
Section Five has been rendered inoperable by Shelby Cnty., now is the 
perfect time for those states that previously would have had to have faced 
that hurdle to experiment. Internet voting is therefore perfectly legal, and 
should be implemented, barring political and policy concerns. 
 
